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Necessary But Not Sufficient: The Role of the EU in Resolving
Turkey's Kurdish Question and the Greek-Turkish Conflicts*
A Y § E B E T U L ^ELIK AND B A H A R RUMELILI**
I Bridging Two Literatures: Conflict Resolution and European Studies
Recently, there is growing interest in how the EU may diminish conflicts and
provide legal and political structures that can deal efficiently with potential
conflicts in candidate countries. Because such issues are the focus of different
disciplines with alternative perspectives, we believe that they should be
studied in an interdisciplinary fashion. In this section, we attempt to bring
together the alternative perspectives provided by the European Studies (ES)
and the Conflict Resolution (CR) literatures.
While the ES literature approaches questions of the EU and conflict
resolution from an EU-centered perspective, the CR literature analyses the
cases where the EU becomes a party within the broader context of the role
that regional organizations play as third parties in interstate and intrastate
conflicts. According to the CR literature, third parties - be they states or
multilateral organizations - have the power to bridge the parties through
building trust, can provide extra resources (information, technology, etc.) to
change the nature of the conflict, and can supply the guarantees needed to
make peace stable.
Third-party roles vary depending on the nature of the conflict, the stage
of the conflict (escalation, peak, de-escalation, reconciliation), the level of
violence, and the nature of the society in which conflict takes place. According
to the CR literature, the third party should not only pay attention to the timing
and the characteristics of the conflict societies, but also synchronize carefully
its efforts with other existing conflict-resolution attempts. Expressed in CR
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Relations Conference, The Hague, 9-11 September 2004, and at K09 University Social Science
Seminar Series. We would like to thank Oliver Richmond, Esra Cuhadar-Gurkaynak, Suhnaz
Yilmaz and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and criticisms.
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terminology, good intervention requires good analysis, a good intervention
process, timing and sequencing.' CR scholars offer a variety of intervention
options at various levels of conflict.^ Choice among these options depends
on the third parties' 'capabilities, leverage, and linkage to the parties, their
level of interest, and the sustainability of their potential commitment to the
intervention role'.^
Among scholars of conflict resolution, there are two major paradigms
on when third-party interventions should best take place. The 'structuralist'
paradigm, treating causes of conflict as objective, argues that a good
intervention should take place at a 'mutually hurting stalemate'" and that
third parties should use 'various side payments and/or penalties and sanctions
to get the parties to the dispute to change their cost-benefit calculations
about the utility of a negotiated settlement'.' On the other hand, the 'social-
psychological' approaches, treating causes of conflict as subjective, contend
that third parties should change the perceptions, attitudes, values and
behaviours of the parties through consultative meetings, problem-solving
workshops, conflict-resolution training, and third-party assistance in
developing and designing alternative dispute-resolution systems. The role of
the third party, according to this paradigm, should be a neutral and essentially
a facilitating one.* The general view on intervention strategies, however, is
that a single intervention strategy is almost always a failure and that it seems
more useful to adopt 'a coordinated series of concurrent and consecutive
strategies directed towards the long-term goal of resolving the conflict'.'
' R.J. Fisher and L. Keashley, 'The Potential Complementarity of Mediation within a
Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention' (1991) 28/1 Journal of Peace Research,
pp. 29-42; C.A. Crocker, 'Intervention: Toward Best Practices and a Holistic View' in CA.
Crocker, F.O. Hampson and P. Aall (eds). Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing
International Conflict (United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C, 2001); D.U. Eralp
and N. Beriker, 'Assessing Conflict Resolution Potential of the EU: The Cyprus Conflict and
Accession Negotiations' (2005) 36 Security Dialogue, pp. 175-192; E. ^uhadar-Gurkaynak
and O. Memi§oglu, 'Varities of Mediating Activities and Their Complementarity in the Cyprus
Conflict' Regional Development Dialogue (forthcoming).
^ For a discussion of these options, see Crocker, note 1 above.
' Ibid., p. 233.
" S.G. Amoo and I.W. Zartman, 'Mediation by Regional Organizations: The Organization
for Africa Unity (OAU) in Chad' in J. Bercovitch and J.Z. Rubin (eds). Mediation in
International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management (St Martin's Press, New
York, 1992), p. 131.
' C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson and P. Aall, 'Multiparty Mediation and the Conflict Cycle'
in C.A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall (eds). Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a
Complex World {\]S,\V, Washington, D.C, 1999), p. 21.
' Ibid., p. 23.
' Fisher and Keashley, note 1 above.
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There is agreement in the literature that, among various third-party actors,
regional organizations have the advantage of being more familiar with local
actors and the situation that led to the conflict.^ Literature on the role of
regional organizations in conflict resolution suggests that these organizations
have a range of capacities for the resolution of conflicts among their
members: the ability to provide a solution, shifting weight (relations with
the parties), persuasion, side payments' and brokering ceasefires during the
early phases of the conflict as well as its escalation and de-escalation. When
regional organizations intervene in a conflict as third parties, they can narrow
the area of uncertainty in disputes which may precipitate conflicts, influence
in a predictable and positive manner the behaviour of parties in the conflict
environment, and help clarify the general bargaining setting and consequently
facilitate the negotiation process.'"
Although a regional organization's strength as a third party stems from its
regional salience and moral authority, in most cases, their third-party roles
in intractable conflicts are constrained as a result of their limited resources
and enforcement power. Amoo and Zartman argue that regional organizations
are limited in their conflict-resolution capacities because of the fact that
'members of the organization have a primary interest in capturing the flag
for their side of the dispute', and thus, 'they are under pressure from their
own members to endorse rather than to mediate.'^^ Another important note
that conflict-resolution scholars often make is that regional organizations are
useful third parties as long as the parties to the conflict are looking for some
acceptable way out of their conflict.'^ Regional organizations are weakest
when the conflict requires complex negotiations and solutions, and when the
issues that lead to conflict are defined as top 'security' issues.
With regard to the timing of the interventions, the CR literature points
that in general, regional organizations have been more effective in preventing
conflicts in their early stages through structural interventions than in making
parties reach a negotiated outcome in later stages through direct intervention.
The conflict prevention role of regional organizations mostly presents itself
in setting and promoting compliance with fundamental norms to prevent
conflicts, promoting the process of democracy building as a foundation for
' Amoo and Zartman, note 4 above; A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes (eds). Preventing
Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations
(Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C, 1996); C Peck, Sustainable Peace: The Role of the
UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
Lanham, Maryland, 1998); C Peck, 'The Role of Regional Organizations in Preventing and
Resolving Conflict' in Crocker, Hampson and P. Aall (2001), note 1 above, pp. 561-584.
' Amoo and Zartman, note 4 above, pp. 132-133.
'" Ibid., p. 135.
" Ibid., p. 131, emphasis added.
'2 Ibid., p. 144.
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peace and security, identifying and responding to brewing conflicts in order
to prevent the outbreak of violence.'^
Near unanimity exists among CR scholars and activists that the regional
organizations in Europe represent the best examples of providing agreed-
upon norms for the implementation of human rights standards and for
monitoring state compliance in order to prevent intrastate and interstate
conflicts.'" Human rights documents established by the Council of Europe
provide crucial guidelines for conflict prevention and human security." And
in providing a framework for preventive diplomacy, facilitating negotiations,
and furthering processes of conflict resolution, primary responsibility has
fallen to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.'* In this
regional context, the EU's power in conflict prevention derives from the fact
that its membership conditionality constitutes a very powerful carrot and stick
mechanism to diffuse these principles and to monitor compliance.
Coming to the European Studies literature, there are well-established
presumptions about the conflict-resolution capacity of the European Union
in the long term. It is assumed that in the course of European integration,
through democratization and the dissolution of borders, intrastate and
interstate disputes will gradually lose their bases and significance. However,
this broad link between integration and peace needs to be analytically
distinguished from the EU's capacity to directly intervene in conflicts of
immediate concern and to resolve them in the short term. The latter entails the
purposive action of various EU organs and includes policies, measures and
communications directed to the conflict parties with the explicit objective of
aiding the resolution of their conflicts.
Until recently, the ES literature has remained rather underdeveloped in
its conceptualization of the EU as a purposive actor in conflict resolution.'^
Recently, however, studies that focus on the role of the European Union
in the resolution of various conflicts have distinguished between the EU
'as an active player' and the EU 'as a framework''^ and combined in their
'^  P.T. Hopmann, 'The Role of Multilateral Organizations in Conflict Resolution: The Case
of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe', Sabanci University, Program on
Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Occasional Papers No. 2, 2002.
'•• See, for example, Chayes and Chayes, note 8 above; Peck (1998), note 8 above; Peck
(2001), note 8 above; Hopmann, note 13 above.
" Peck (2001), note 8 above.
" Hopmann, note 13 above.
" Perhaps the underdeveloped status of the literature can be explained by the fact that until
recently the EC/EU itself was quite hesitant and timid to intervene directly in interstate and
intrastate disputes.
'* G. Noutcheva, N. Tocci, B. Coppieters, T Kovziridze, M. Emerson and M. Huysseune,
'Europeanization and Secessionist Conflicts: Concepts and Theories' (2004) Journal on
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Special Focus 1, pp. 1-35.
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analyses the indirect effects of integration and association with the purposive
interventions of the EU in conflicts."
For example, Diez et al. have argued that the EU potentially can impact
border conflicts through direct and indirect pathways:^" As a purposive actor
in conflict resolution, the EU can directly employ the carrot and stick of
granting or withdrawing membership, candidacy or association status, or
specific benefits associated with those positions to coerce or induce parties
to seek resolution of their disputes ('compulsory impact'). Membership
conditionality has been identified as by far the most powerful (though not
necessarily always effective) conflict-resolution mechanism at the EU's
disposal.^' Simultaneously, the EU can selectively direct material resources
to non-governmental initiatives in conflict societies, which are promoting
intersocietal collaboration and advocating peaceful resolution of disputes
('connective impact'). The EU actors themselves consider support directed
to civil society actors as their most effective instrument of conflict resolution
and more in congruence with the proclaimed identity of the EU as a civilian
and normative power.^ ^
In terms of the EU's indirect influences, Diez et al. argue that the EU
framework, first of all, rationalizes and legitimizes the pursuit of alternative
policy options at the domestic elite level ('enabling impact')." Conflict
parties come to redefine their interests as they realize that the benefits of
interdependence (in the case of interstate disputes) and democratization (in
the case of intrastate disputes) outweigh the costs of continued conflict. In
addition, in the course of their participation in the European integration
process, conflict parties come to internalize the norm of peaceful conflict
resolution. Another indirect conflict-resolution pathway is the EU's
discursive power to change the prevalent construction of identities and of
the conflict in conflict societies ('constructive impact'). The processes of
European integration and EU accession activate certain discourses in conflict
societies that 'desecuritize' the conflicts, that is to transform them from being
conflicts over identity and 'security' into disagreements about issues that do
not threaten identity or security.
" C Hill, 'The EU's Capacity for Conflict Prevention' (2001) 6 EFA Rev, pp. 315-333;
N. Tocci, 'EU Intervention in Ethno-political Conflicts: The Cases of Cyprus and Serbia-
Montenegro' (2004) 9 EFA Rev, pp. 551-573.
™ T. Diez, S. Stetter and M. Albert, 'The European Union and Border Conflicts: The
Transformative Impact of Association' (2006) 60/3 International Organization (forthcoming).
'^ Tocci, note 19 above.
^^  I. Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?' (2002) 40 Journal of
Common Market Studies, pp. 235-258; M. Pace, 'Governing Border Conflicts: When can the
European Union be an Effective Mediator?', paper presented at the Annual Convention of the
International Studies Association, Montreal, 17-21 March 2004.
^^  Diez et al., note 20 above.
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In analysing the role of the EU in conflict resolution, the ES and CR
literatures stand to benefit from a closer engagement with each other.
Insights from the CR literature would enable European Studies scholars
to put the conflict-resolution activities of the EU in a broader context with
other possible third-party roles.^ ^ More specifically, there is not much of a
discussion among European Studies scholars on how the EU may engage in
direct interventions to the conflict process, which lead the conflict parties to
a negotiated solution of their disputes. In fact, what are referred to as 'direct'
interventions in the ES literature are considered to be structural interventions
in the CR literature,^' precisely because they leave the actual resolution of
the conflicts to the conflict parties. In the cases of Turkey's Kurdish and
the Greek-^Turkish conflicts, our analysis shows that the EU influences,
while leading to a significant degree of conflict de-escalation, have not been
sufficient in bringing about the actual resolution of the conflicts.
In addition, the CR literature alerts us to several limitations that the EU
faces in conflict resolution. CR scholars are in agreement that different types
of intervention are necessary for different types as well as different stages
of conflicts. However, because conflict resolution becomes derivative of
and secondary to the EU's priorities in its enlargement policy and external
relations, the EU cannot be attentive to the concerns of timing and sequencing
with respect to the particular characteristics and stages of intrastate and
interstate conflicts. Related to this, these mechanisms are the most effective
in relation to conflict parties that are in the EU accession process and have
credible membership prospects. In addition, as the case of Greek-Turkish
conflicts will show, the EU faces a particularly challenging limitation in the
case of interstate conflicts that involve Member and non-Member States. In
such cases, the EU is institutionally vulnerable to capture by the Member
State and losing its impartial status, which, according the CR literature, is a
key to effective conflict resolution.
Similarly, the CR literature stands to benefit from a closer engagement with
the ES literature, especially in paying due attention to the EU's effectiveness
in legitimizing the pursuit of alternative policies and in shaping the dominant
constructions of identities in the conflict societies. As will be discussed
below, our comparative analysis of the EU's impact on Greek-Turkish and
Turkey's Kurdish conflicts suggests that such indirect, ideational forms of EU
influence have been primarily important in both cases.
'^' For an interesting comparison of the liberal modernist approach of the UN and the
integrationist, post-modernist approach of the EU to the Cyprus problem, see O.P. Richmond,
'Shared Sovereignty and the Politics of Peace: Evaluating the EU's "Catalytic" Framework in
the Eastern Mediterrannean' (2005) 81 International Affairs, pp. 905-923.
" Eralp and Beriker, note 1 above.
THE EU IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 209
II The EU's Impact on Turkey's Kurdish Question1^,26
According to the CR literature, internal identity-based conflicts, such as
Turkey's Kurdish question, are the hardest in which to intervene because
of sovereignty concerns. The Copenhagen Criteria became the primary
instrument that the EU strongly and repeatedly used as a vehicle to overcome
such conflicts in Turkey" and other candidate states. Within the context of
Turkey's Kurdish question, the EU was most concerned about human rights
abuses, the cultural rights of minorities and the removal of the state of
emergency in eastern and southeastern Anatolia, and overall the Commission
paid a special attention to the structural problems in Turkish democracy.
Among the Copenhagen Criteria were political criteria indirectly affecting
the issues related to Turkey's internal displacement policies and its approach
to the Kurdish question. Of the political standards, respect for the principle
of the rule of law and minority rights serves as a crucial part of the basis for
compliance.
Although the Copenhagen Criteria are part of the membership conditionality,
the EU was able to effectively exert pressure on Turkey even before the
declaration of its membership candidacy.^^ For example, prior to the 1995 EU-
Turkey Customs Union Agreement (CUA), the European Parliament asked
Turkey to progress toward solving its Kurdish problem, along with such other
issues such as changing the 1982 constitution, and Article 8 of the Anti-Terror
Law,^' as well as improving the situation of the MPs from the pro-Kurdish
Democracy Party (DEP),3° and human rights practices.^' In response, Turkey
^' Although Turkey's Kurdish Question stems back to the Ottoman period, intensifying after
the foundation of the Turkish Republic, with 18 rebellions taking place between 1924 and 1938
(K. Kiri^fi and G. Winrow, A Translation of the Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of
a Tran-State Ethnic Conflict (Frank Cass, London, 1997), p. 100), this paper focuses on the
current phase of the conflict from 1984 onwards when the PKK became an important actor in
the conflict and the Turkish state engaged in armed response to the PKK's secessionist claims.
" For a detailed discussion on how the EU uses the 'conditionality principle' and its
limitations for the case of Turkey, see A. Gates 'Negotiating Turkey's Accession: The
Limitations of the Current EU Strategy' (2005) 10 EFA Rev, pp. 381-397.
^' The institutional relations between Turkey and the EU have a long history, dating back
to the 1963 Association Agreement. For historical accounts of EU-Turkey relations, see M.
Muftuler-Ba?, 'The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union' (1999) 34/4 Middle
Eastern Studies, pp. 240-258. Turkey was declared a candidate for EU membership at the
1999 Helsinki European Council, and officially began accession negotiations with the EU on
3 October 2005.
" See the Republic of Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at <www.mfa.gov.tr>.
'" On 16 June 1994, Turkey's Constitutional Court banned the pro-Kurdish Democracy
Party (DEP). Its thirteen deputies were stripped of parliamentary immunity, and seven who did
not flee abroad were charged with treason and put in jail.
3' Muftuler-Ba9, note 28 above.
210 CELIK AND RUMELILI
modified some articles in the constitution to broaden political participation,
and softened Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law; however, it recorded no
improvement in the case of the Kurdish MPs. As a result, the ratification of the
EU-Turkey CUA in the European Parliament came very close to rejection on
13 December 1995, and was accepted only with the added stipulation that in
case of a deterioration of human rights, the financial aid enabled through the
Customs Union could be frozen.^ ^ Following the activation of the CUA, on 17
January 1996, the European Parliament awarded Leyla Zana, the only female
Kurdish MP in prison, the Sakharov Prize" as a warning to Turkey. During
the same period, the European Parliament also warned Turkey about some
of its practices and voted to force the Turkish government to grant a general
amnesty and start negotiations with all Kurdish organizations, including the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), for a possible political solution in 1997.3"
At the following Luxembourg Summit of the European Council in
December 1997, when the EU did not include Turkey in its plans for future
enlargement, one of the political conditions mentioned by the EU was the
improvement of human rights practices and treatment of Kurdish citizens,
a condition to which the Turkish state reacted harshly.^ ^ Subsequently, the
European Commission's Progress Reports of 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001
presented Turkey's adherence to the political conditions of the Copenhagen
Criteria as an important condition to start the accession negotiations.^ '^
However, the Copenhagen Criteria could only be applied to the candidate
states. That's why more powerful steps to transform the Kurdish question were
taken after Turkey's candidacy has been accepted at the Helsinki Summit of
December 1999." These problems were so central to the EU that the Council's
decisions re-emphasized that Turkey should progress towards 'fulfilling the
political criteria with particular reference to the issue of human rights'.^^ In
November 2000, the EU issued an Accession Partnership Document with a
list of issues Turkey had to address. These issues dealt mainly with minority
rights, torture, the role of the military in politics, and the Cyprus issue. Turkey
" Turkish Daily News, 14 December 1995.
" I.D. Dagi, Insan Haklari, Kiiresel Siyaset ve Turkiye (Boyut Kitaplari, Istanbul 2001)
'" Ibid., p. 131.
" B.A. Yejilada, 'The Worsening of EU-Turkey Relations' (1999) 19/1 SAIS Review.
" European Commission, The Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession,
Brussels (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001) available at <www.eu.int>.
" It is important to note that this period also signifies a period where other third parties
such as the USA became less of a visible actor. However, one can argue that the USA is still an
important actor affecting Turkish-EU relations; see S. Wood and W. Quaisser, 'Turkey's Road
to the EU: Political Dynamics, Strategic Context and Implications for Europe' (2005) 10 EFA
Rev, pp. 147-173.
'* Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999. cf. M.
Muftuler-Ba?, 'Enlarging the European Union: Where does Turkey stand', Turkish Social and
Economic Studies Foundation, TESEV monograph, Istanbul, 2002.
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adopted its National Programme for Adoption of the acquis in March 2001
that resulted in the enactment of 89 new laws and amendments to 94 others in
order to, inter alia, 'improve Turkey's human rights and bring the country's
inflation-prone economy up to European standards'.^^
In the Turkish context, the EU's mechanisms to transform the Kurdish
question proved more effective after Turkey's status was elevated to a
candidate. As part of harmonizing its laws with the European norms in the
process for the adoption of the acquis, Turkey signed several important
international documents that guarantee the social, economic, cultural and
political rights of its citizens."" It also ratified Protocol 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (abolition of the capital punishmenf'); and
showed its official intent to comply with the judgments of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
particularly judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (section II of
the Convention)."^
In its recommendation report released in October 2004, the European
Commission for the first time clearly discussed the situation of the Kurdish
minority rather than implicitly referring to the cultural rights of the
minorities."' After reporting that Turkey has signed important international
treaties that guarantee minority protection and that it showed improvement
in the use of Kurdish language in public, the report stated that 'the measures
adopted in the area of cultural rights represent only a starting point. There
are still considerable restrictions, in particular in the area of broadcasting and
education in minority languages.'"" It also criticized Turkey for not taking
enough measures to develop the southeastern Anatolian region, where Kurds
are highly congregated, to foster return migration of the displaced people from
the region. The report specifically spelled out the need for 'the establishment
of conditions for the full enjoyment of rights and freedoms by the Kurds'."'
3» p. Martin, E. Midgley and M. Teitelbaum, 'Best Practice Options: Turkey' (2002) 40/3
International Migration, pp. 119-129.
"" Among these, we can list the 1969 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, and the European Agreement Relating to Persons Participating in
Proceedings of the European Court of Human Rights.
•" Even though since 1984 there have been no executions exercised in Turkey, the Turkish
Penal Code, until recently, provided for the death penalty for nine different offences. The
Turkish Grand National Assembly passed the resolution to abolish capital punishment and to
replace it with life imprisonment without remission on 3 August 2002, and signed Protocol 6
oftheECHRt.
"^  Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission
to the Council, Strengthening the Accession Strategy for Turkey, Brussels 2003. See also
<www.abhaber.com>.
"5 Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession,
Brussels, 6.10.2004, COM (2004) 656 final.
« Ibid., p. l3.
« Ibid., p. l3.
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The basic problem in analysing Turkey's Kurdish question from a CR
perspective is that one of the parties to the confiict does not recognize any
person/organization/institution claiming to represent the other party as a
legitimate actor. This is mostly because throughout the 1980s the Kurdish
question had been put on Turkey's agenda through the PKK's activities. Many
state officers for a long time perceived the confiict as a terrorism whose aim
was to carve out an independent Kurdistan within the territories of the Turkish
state. Considering the PKK a 'terrorist' organization, the Turkish state did
not consider the issue anything other than terrorism and treated its Kurdish
population as part of its whole Turkish citizen population, thereby not
granting a special status for minority rights. That is why the Kurdish question
was never pronounced as an issue of cultural rights or ethnic confiict but
as terrorism or in the best case as a 'southeast underdevelopment problem',
whereas the Kurdish population and the international community perceived
the issue as an identity conflict and a representation problem. This approach
also made the State turn down the idea that some special rights should be
granted to this population. From the State's point of view, the whole issue was
related to sovereignty issues.
From an ES perspective, the EU has contributed to important changes at
the domestic-policy level in Turkey with respect to the Kurdish question,
especially after the acceptance of Turkey's candidacy to the Union!
Membership conditionality became an important carrot mechanism for
Turkey to undertake some previously very controversial policy changes, such
as the abolition of the death penalty and the release of the Kurdish MPs from
prison.
In terms of the pathways of EU infiuence of Diez et al., we can say that
the EU's enabling and constructive impacts have been the strongest on
Turkey's Kurdish question. Through Turkey's involvement in the European
integration process, the Turkish state started treating its Kurdish question
as a democratization issue if not an unpronounced minority representation
issue. That is to say, after the earlier treatment of the confiict merely as a
development or a terrorism problem, since 1999 the Turkish political public
started to talk about linguistic rights, removal of the state of emergency, return
to and reconstruction of the post-confiict zones, and release of the Kurdish
MPs. The NGOs representing such stakes in the Turkish public all refer to the
EU as the most important actor in bringing the confiict to this stage. When
analysed carefully, it is obvious that at least on paper, this was a big turning
point in the history of the Kurdish question. Although it cannot be argued that
the two sides came to a complete understanding and respect for each other's
needs, it seems that, with the involvement of the EU, at least the parties have
started to change positions. From the State's perspective, it moved from
complete denial to a more 'acceptance of difference' whereas for the Kurdish
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citizens of Turkey, it was moving away from the idea of an independent state to
more of an emphasis on asking for cultural rights and political representation
within the existing state."* Therefore, even the nature of the conflict perceived
by each party changed as the EU became an important actor in the conflict.
At the same time, the EU's interventions in the conflict through allocating
some fmancial resources to the civil societies might have some important
altering effects. These projects may not only pave the way for bridging the
parties closer, but also might empower those that have been hurt during the
process."' In Turkey, the post-1999 period saw the flourishing of more civil
society attempts and pressures for more peaceful societies. Although these
attempts date back to earlier phases, and are still restricted due to state
pressures, civil society organizations became vocal actors of democratization,
understanding, rapprochement and the diffusion of social norms necessary
for a conflict-free society. The strengthening of these organizations was an
outcome of the EU integration process and EU pressures.
We have to note that the European Union, due to its complex structure,
did not take a unified position on Turkey's Kurdish question. The Council
and the Commission mostly refrained from suggesting that there is a conflict
that needs to be resolved, but rather emphasized the fact that the Turkish state
should improve the cultural rights of all its citizens. The assumption behind
this approach is that rather than negotiating issues explicitly and undergoing
a healing process, once the country conforms to the democratic and cultural
norms of the organization, there would be no issue to have conflict over.
The European Parliament (EP), on the other hand, had a different approach.
Not only did several resolutions passed by the EP explicitly pronounce
'the recognition of the Kurdish identity' but the EP also asked the Turkish
authorities to accept international initiatives to provide a dialogue between
the State and the representatives of the Kurdish segment of the society. For
example, in a resolution passed in 1998, the EP reaffirmed 'its view that a
solution of the conflict in the southeast can only be achieved politically' and
supported 'proposals aimed at providing legal recognition of Kurdish identity
and national and international initiatives which could promote dialogue and
negotiation between the parties'."^
•** Of course, this should not suggest that the PKK halted its activities nor that it lost its
support completely. We should also be careful in not treating the Kurdish population as an
homogenous entity. One can depict several tendencies among Kurds. Yet, the general tendency
is more towards a belief that the EU negotiation period will bring more opportunities for
overcoming the problems.
"' One such example for the latter case is the European Commission's grant to the
Diyarbakir Bar Association for teaching Kurdish citizens their rights, especially about human
rights and right to return to their homes.
"* A4-0251/98 Resolution on the Commission reports on developments in relations with
Turkey since the entry into force of the Customs Union.
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However, as discussed earlier, in its 2004 Progress Report on Turkey, the
European Commission specifically mentioned the developments and areas
that required improvement (related to the Kurds and southeastern Turkey
where the Kurds are highly congregated). Even though this might look as if
the Commission has changed its approach towards spelling out 'the other'
party in the issue, another interpretation might be that as Turkey engages with
the negotiation process further, issues get laid down in more detail.
In assessing the EU's impact on Turkey's Kurdish question, one also has to
keep in mind that for the Kurdish citizens of Turkey, the process went hand in
hand with another development. The year Turkey was accepted as a candidate
was also the year when the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured.
This broke the hopes of many which set their hopes on what the PKK has
been fighting for and left only democratic means to voice their demands as a
viable solution. The capture of Ocalan also paved the way for the flourishing
of the civil society organizations that address the issue. The softening of the
discourses in Turkish and Kurdish society also coincides with the capture of
Ocalan and the decreasing intensity of the conflict following it. Because these
two events overlap, the effect of the EU as an actor in the process became
much more powerful. Had Ocalan not been captured, one could legitimately
question the effectiveness ofthis rapprochement, socialization by integration,
as well as changes at the domestic-policy level.
From a CR perspective, what makes the EU significant as a third party to
the conflict is that, compared to many other international organizations, it had
the biggest effect in changing the position of the Turkish state through its use
of the membership 'carrot'. In Rubin's terms, the EU had the coercive, reward,
legitimate and referent power to introduce itself as a third party to the Kurdish
question but it ignored the fact that social confiict involves a dynamic process
and that 'different interventions will be appropriate at different stages of the
conflict'."' What the EU does, especially in deep-rooted conflicts, is to ignore
the fact that every conflict has its own nature and stages and that different
strategies should be used to change the perceptions and attitudes of the parties
since 'no one third party method should be expected to deal with all or even
most elements of a given confiict'.^° The assumption is that through structural
intervention (e.g. decreasing human rights abuses, protecting cultural rights,
strengthening democratic governance, etc.) ethnic confiicts can be resolved.
Although these mechanisms seem to have worked to a certain degree at least
for the moment, many civil organizations representing the dissident Kurdish
population find these attempts insincere and temporary.
Fisher and Keashley, note 1 above, p. 34.
Ibid., p. 34.
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III The EU's Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict '^
In analysing the impact of the EU on the Greek-Turkish conflict, it is
important to stress, first of all, that the EU has played a qualitatively different
third-party role in Greek-Turkish disputes than either the USA or NATO.
The interventions of the latter, usually directed at the political leadership in
crisis periods, have prevented the outbreak of militarized conflict, but have
not succeeded in pushing the conflict parties towards a resolution of their
disputes. However, as a security community, the EU has played a critical role
in transforming Greek-Turkish disputes, especially since 1999.
The EU's interventions in Greek-Turkish disputes have followed the
long history of the two states' institutional relations with the EEC/EC/EU.
However, prior to 1999, these interventions only led to brief and tactical
improvements in Greek-Turkish relations and did not affect the underlying
identity and interest defmitions and conflict conceptions. For example,
during Greece's application and membership process from 1975 to 1981, the
EC's stated reservations about importing Greek-Turkish disputes" forced
the Greek policy-makers to restrain themselves from further escalating the
crises during an especially tense period in bilateral relations. Couloumbis and
Yannas argue that how the Greek prime minister, Karamanlis, chose to handle
Greek-Turkish relations following the Turkish 'invasion' of Cyprus in 1974
reflected 'the deep impact that the prospect of EU accession exercised on
post-1974 Greek foreign policy'." When the 1976 Aegean continental shelf
crisis erupted right after the filing of the Greek application for membership to
the EEC in June 1975, Karamanlis chose to deal with the crisis by taking the
issue to the United Nations Security Council and the International Court of
Justice, rather than by military means.''' In addition, the period from Greece's
application in 1975 to its membership in 1981 was marked by several attempts
" Greek-Turkish eonflicts have long roots in history. In the contemporary period, the two
states came close to war over Cyprus in 1964 and during Turkey's 1974 military operation,
over the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf in 1976 and 1987, and most recently, over
the status of the uninhabited Imia/Kardak islets in 1996.
" When Greece applied for full membership in the EC in 1975, the Council of Ministers
communicated its concern for maintaining an equitable relationship with Greece and Turkey
by explicitly assuring the Turkish government that the Greek application would not affect
Turkey's rights. In addition, in its opinion on the Greek application, the European Commission
expressed its concern about importing conflicts and recommended a pre-accession period
that would allow, among other things, for the settlement of Greek-Turkish disputes. The
Commission opinion was overruled in the Council of Ministers meeting in February 1976 by
extensive Greek lobbying.
" T. A. Couloumbis and P. Yannas, 'Greek Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s' in K.
Featherstone and K. Ifantis (eds), Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration
and Balkan Disintegration? (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1994), pp. 160-175.
''' P. Tsakaloyannis, 'European Community and Greek-Turkish Dispute' (1980) 29 Journal
of Common Market Studies, pp. 35-54.
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at dialogue, which were mainly driven by Karamanlis' desire to secure Greek
membership of the E E C '
Similarly, following Turkey's application for EC membership in 1987,
Greek-Turkish relations enjoyed another temporary period of improvement.
Replicating the Greek pattern, Turkey's reaction to the second crisis over the
continental shelf in 1987 was restrained as it occurred right before Turkey filed
its application for membership in the EC.'^ Aware that improved relations with
Greece were necessary to prevent a Greek veto and to strengthen Turkey's
membership prospects in the EC, Turkey's prime minister, Ozal, adroitly
defused the crisis and actively pursued dialogue with Greece." However, the
European Commission's Opinion on Turkey's application in 1989 pointed out
that the Greek-Turkish disputes, as well as the Cyprus problem, constituted
negative factors for Turkey's admission.
These brief periods of relative improvement in bilateral relations, coinciding
with the membership applications of the two states to the EC, could not be
sustained because the underlying perceptions of the conflict and national
interest remained the same. The post-1974 Greek foreign policy consensus
based on the deterrence of the Turkish threat was not challenged by Greece's
EC membership in 1981. If anything, EC membership was perceived as and
valued for having provided Greece with bargaining advantages in its dealings
with Turkey. Afterwards, as Turkey sought closer relations with the EC,
Greece quite successfully used its membership as a diplomatic lever to extract
concessions from Turkey.'* As a result, Greece's membership has created and
sustained the understanding in Turkey that the EC/EU has become 'captured'
by Greece, and therefore, cannot be impartial with respect to Greek-Turkish
issues. Consequently, the EU's direct interventions in the form of warnings
that the Cyprus problem and Greek-Turkish disputes would affect EU-Turkey
relations were negatively interpreted as Greece's doing, and moreover, as
reflections of a European reluctance to take Turkey into the EC/EU.''
As Turkey intensified its pursuit of EU membership in the context
of deteriorating Greek-Turkish relations, the Union continued its direct
interventions in Greek-Turkish disputes by making the resolution of the
disputes a condition for furthering relations with Turkey. For example, in
reaction to the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis, the EU took a firm line towards
" G. Pridham, 'Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement' in D.
Constas (ed.). The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences,
(St.Martin's Press, NewYork 1991), pp. 73-88.
"* Ibid.
" Ibid.
'* P. Yannas, 'The Greek Factor in EC-Turkey Relations' in P. Kazakos and P.C. Ioakimidis
(eds), Greece and EC Membership Evaluated (Pinter PuhVisheis, London, 1994), pp. 215-221.
' ' M. Ugur, The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemma (Ashgate,
Aldershot, 1999).
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Turkey in solidarity with Greece. The European Union statement, dated 15
July 1996, warned that 'the relations between Turkey and the EU have to
be based on a clear commitment to the principle of respect for international
law and agreements, the relevant international practice, and the sovereignty
and the territorial integrity of the member states and of Turkey'. In addition,
the Council called for restraint, the pursuit of dialogue, and proposed the
establishment of a crisis prevention mechanism as well as the submission of
the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Consequently, EU-Turkey
relations hit rock bottom during the Luxembourg European Council on 12-13
December 1997, where the EU did not grant Turkey candidacy status while
further advancing its relations with other candidate states. The Presidency
Conclusions noted that 'strengthening Turkey's links with the EU depends
on . . . the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece
and Turkey'. Even though the deteriorating relations with Greece took their
toll on Turkey's EU membership bid, the EU's interventions and pressure on
Turkey did not lead to an improvement in Greek-Turkish relations.
By the autumn of 1999, the deadly earthquakes in Izmit and Athens, as well
as a change of cabinet in Greece, jolted Greek-Turkish relations out of their
conflictual course and onto a European course of cooperation. The long-term
influences of European integration on Greek foreign policy''" came to fruition
when combined with Greece's objective to secure entry into the EMU by
increasing its bargaining position with the Community. Thus, the new foreign
minister, George Papandreou, was able to put into full practice a policy of
engagement that supported the European orientation of Turkey instead of a
policy of deterrence based on using its EU membership as a lever against
Turkey. Meanwhile, the deadly earthquakes in Izmit and Athens, respectively
in August and September 1999, brought out feelings of empathy and solidarity
between the Greek and Turkish people.
Reflecting this policy change, Greece chose not to use its veto against the
EU's decision to grant Turkey candidacy status during the Helsinki European
Council on 10-11 December 1999. The Helsinki Council decisions established
the peaceful resolution of outstanding border disputes as a community principle
and urged candidate states 'to make every effort' to resolve any outstanding
disputes, and if these efforts fail, to bring the disputes before the International
Court of Justice. The European Council has also set the end of 2004 as
the latest date by which it will review the situation relating to outstanding
disputes and their repercussions on the accession process. Incorporated into
the Turkey's Accession Partnership Agreement and National Program, the
'" D. Keridis, 'Domestic Developments and Foreign Policy' in D. Keridis and D.
Triantaphyllou (eds), Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization (Brassey's Inc.,
Dulles V.A., 1994), pp. 2-18.
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Helsinki Council decisions linked progress on Turkey's membership with the
resolution of its border conflicts with Greece.
After 1999, many things changed in Greek-Turkish relations.*' The two
states agreed to cooperate in various issues, such as tourism promotion, the
fight against terrorism, the removal of landmines along the border, illegal
migration, incentives for trade and mutual investment, and environmental
and health issues. In addition, as confidence-building measures within the
framework of NATO, the two states have agreed to reduce and exchange
information about military exercises. Most importantly, Turkey's EU
membership became the focal point of bilateral cooperation. Greece, which
had persistently vetoed any advances in the relations between Turkey and the
EU, suddenly became the most ardent supporter of Turkey's EU membership.
Progress towards the resolution of bilateral disputes has been slow; between
2002 and 2004, thirty-plus rounds of secret negotiations have taken place at
the technical level between the two foreign ministries.
The trajectory of Greek-Turkish relations presented above poses a two-
sided puzzle in terms of the EU's impact." On the one hand, there is the need
to account for the pre-1999 phase in Greek-Turkish relations, during which
the relations between the two states remained conflictual in spite of their
close association with the EU. The EU failed to have a positive impact on
the Greek-Turkish conflicts in this period, and was often abused as a forum
for continued rivalry. On the other hand, there is the need to explain the
post-1999 phase in Greek-Turkish relations, where we observe a promising
rapprochement founded on the principles and procedures of the EU.
In analysing both sides ofthis puzzle, the CR perspective would emphasize
that Greece's EU membership significantly constrained the EU in positively
influencing the Greek-Turkish conflicts. Because Greece is a Member State
and Turkey is a non-member of the EU, the EU is under pressure to endorse
the Greek position and cannot effectively mediate between Greece and
Turkey.*^ This explains the widespread perceptions of the EU by the conflict
parties, especially prior to 1999. Greece perceived the EU as a lever to be
used against Turkey, and Turkey perceived the EU as captured by Greece.
However, it cannot explain how such perceptions became less prevalent
and less determinative of policy in the two countries after 1999 while their
institutional positions with respect to the EU stayed the same.
In explaining the transformation of Greek-Turkish relations since 1999,
both the CR and the ES perspectives would stress the importance of the credible
'"' A. Heraclides, 'Greek-Turkish Relations from Discord to Detente: A Preliminary
Evaluation' (2002) 1 The Review of International Affairs, pp. 17-32; Keridis, note 60 above.
" B. Rumelili, 'The European Union's Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict: A Review
of the Literature', Working Paper Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies No. 6, University of
Birmingham, 2004.
" Amoo and Zartman, note 4 above.
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membership carrot offered to Turkey at the Helsinki European Council. Just
as in the case of the Kurdish question, the EU candidacy status has been the
main instigator for policy change in Turkey towards Greece. Turkish policy-
makers, who were otherwise opposed to conciliatory moves towards Greece,
have altered their cost-benefit calculations, and come to support the Greek-
Turkish rapprochement because they view Turkey's EU membership as the
foremost strategic objective. As one former Turkish diplomat put it: 'We are
pursuing good relations with Greece because we want to get into the EU.'*''
In addition to the credible membership carrot, the CR perspective would
also point to the importance of good timing. The Helsinki Council decisions
were so effective in producing policy change because they built upon and
in fact were made possible by the widespread popular feelings of empathy
generated by the twin earthquakes in Turkey and Greece. In the absence
of such a positive atmosphere in bilateral relations, the Helsinki decisions
themselves could not have been taken because the compromises involved
would not have been accepted by either Greece or Turkey. As has been the
case in the past, Greece would have insisted that Turkey's candidacy be made
conditional on the improvement of its relations with Greece, and Turkey
would have rejected the attachment of such conditions to its relations with
the EU. Moreover, the earthquakes paved the way for civil society actors in
the two countries to play an independent critical role in bilateral relations. For
the first time, the impetus for change came from the societal level, and the
leaders pursuing the rapprochement could claim to act on a popular mandate.*'
The EU's 'connective impact' through funding Greek-Turkish civil society
initiatives built upon their earlier development in this period.''*
On the other hand, because of the attention it devotes to the longer-term,
indirect, ideational influences of the EU, the ES literature has an advantage
in explaining how the policy change in Greece came about. Because of
Greece's membership, the EU lacked effective carrot and stick instruments
to coerce or induce policy change in Greece. In this context, the EU's
'enabling' and 'constructive' impacts became more paramount. Turkey's
membership perspective in the EU offered both conflict parties the eventual
possibility of conflict transformation through co-membership in the EU. In
Greece, Turkey's EU membership perspective has been the crucial basis on
which the alternative policy of supporting Turkey's Europeanization has
been erected and advocated. Also, in Turkey, the candidacy status fostered
positive identification with the EU, and legitimized the joint efforts to gain
'" Personal interview, 4 March 2004.
" A. Gundogdu, 'Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of
Transformation?' (2001) 5 Middle East Review of International Affairs, pp. 106-117.
"• B. Rumelili, 'Civil Society and the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish Cooperation'
(2005) 10 South European Society and Politics, pp. 43-54.
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membership in the EU and to resolve the outstanding disputes with Greece.*'' In
addition, Turkey's EU membership candidacy has fostered a more pluralistic
perception of Turkey in Greece, and promoted the construction of Turkey as
a 'Europeanizing' rather than a 'non-European' state.** The support given by
Greece to Turkey's membership bid after 1999 promoted constructions of
Greece in Turkey as less threatening.
Finally, the CR literature would point to the fact that while these various
forms of EU influence have facilitated significant conflict de-escalation,
they have not been sufficient to bring about an actual resolution of the
Greek-Turkish disputes. Even though the 1999 Helsinki Council decisions
had stipulated that if the parties fail to resolve their disputes by 2004 through
bilateral negotiations they should refer them to the ICJ, this deadline has
not been respected. Believing that Turkey's EU accession process will be a
stronger incentive for the resolution of bilateral disputes than the pressure
of a deadline, the Greek government announced in the spring of 2004 that
it will not insist on the 2004 deadline set by the Helsinki European Council
and that it is willing to extend the negotiations beyond. The EU has modified
its stance on the Greek-Turkish disputes accordingly. The 16-17 December
2004 Brussels European Council conclusions 'welcomed the improvement in
Turkey's relations with its neighbors and its readiness to continue to work
with the concerned Member States towards resolution of outstanding border
disputes'; and stated that 'unresolved disputes having repercussions on the
accession process, should if necessary be brought to the International Court
of Justice for settlement' (emphasis added).
IV Conclusions
The comparative analysis of the EU's role in the Greek-Turkish conflict and
the Kurdish question yields important insights, both in terms of evaluating
the EU's role in conflict resolution and of assessing the relative strengths
and weaknesses of the CR and ES literatures. The common thread in the
EU's involvement in both conflicts is that the EU became a force for change
only after Turkey began to enjoy credible membership prospects after the
declaration of its candidacy in 1999. Turkey's EU membership candidacy
generated the conditions for a successful rapprochement between Greece
and Turkey, and the attractiveness of the membership carrot led to Turkey's
acceptance of more cultural rights and the opening up of the political system
^ Rumelili, note 62 above; Rumelili, note 66 above.
*^ B. Rumelili, 'Liminality and Perpetuation of Conflicts: Turkish-Greek Relations in
the Context of Community-Building by the EU' (2003) 9 European Journal of International
Relations, pp. 213-248.
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to resolve the political tension in its Kurdish question. While the extent of
change experienced after 1999 points to the power of the EU in conflict
resolution, the fact that membership candidacy was a necessary condition for
a credible EU impact in both cases indicates a very significant limitation: that
the EU's capacity in conflict resolution in its near abroad is dependent on and
in fact derives from the enlargement process.
The comparative analysis of both cases also indicates a particular
intertwining of direct and indirect influences by the EU. In both cases, the
credible membership carrot that the EU offered to Turkey after Helsinki
induced Turkey to undertake important policy changes, and the EU framework
enabled the conflict parties to alter their perceptions of their interests and of
the conflict. In the case of Greek-Turkish disputes, the Helsinki decisions
induced Turkey to accept the linkage between Turkey's membership process
and the resolution of these disputes, to pursue negotiations on bilateral
disputes with a view towards their subsequent referral to the ICJ, and to engage
in extensive functional cooperation. In both Greece and Turkey, Turkey's
potential EU membership became the basis for alternative, more conciliatory,
policies towards the other. In the case of Turkey's Kurdish question, the EU
has induced Turkey to accept and implement international human rights. It
also helped the Turkish state to use more 'constructive' means to deal with the
conflict - although indirectly - and offered alternative perspectives to many
of its Kurdish citizens.
Viewed from a CR perspective, however, the policy changes induced by the
EU membership carrot constitute an indirect route to conflict resolution, as
they may not be sufficient to bring about actual resolution and reconciliation.
Recent developments in both cases have brought such questions of sufficiency
to the surface. The 12 May 2005 decision of the European Court of Human
Rights that the trial of Ocalan was not 'fair', the burning of a Turkish flag by
Kurdish demonstrators in March 2005 and the PKK's taking up arms again in
October 2005 have reignited tensions around the Kurdish question in Turkey.
Similarly, although short lived, the tension over the Imia/Kardak islets in
April 2005 led many to question how strong the improved Greek-Turkish
relations have become within the EU context.
In addition, the trajectory of the EU's role in both conflicts indicates the
importance of timing, which is cited as an important condition of successful
third-party intervention in the CR literature, but widely neglected in the
ES literature. In both the Greek-Turkish and Turkey's Kurdish conflicts,
the EU interventions followed and benefitted from important independent
developments in the conflicts. In the case of the Kurdish question, as
previously discussed, the capture of Ocalan contributed to the easing of
violence and the moderation of Kurdish nationalists, which made it possible
for parties to embrace the democratization agenda promoted by the EU. In the
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case of the Greek-Turkish disputes, the earthquakes that Izmit and Athens
suffered respectively in 1999 acted as an important catalyst in fostering civil
society cooperation and initiating the Greek-Turkish rapprochement which
the EU instigated and encouraged.

